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ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
PRICE COMPETITION AS AFFECTED BY
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
EDWARD BURLING, JR.* AND WILLIAM DuBosE SHELDON*
Price competition is an historic, orthodox, and, to judge by recent
legislation, obsolescent desideratum. Replacing an earlier stressing of
the beneficial fruits of free and open price competition, new concepts
appear in the legal-economic vocabulary of the antitrust lawyer: price
maintenance, price control, price stabilization, price fixing, price dis-
crimination. These terms, in some instances, are merely the mirror
image of price competition; but it is suggested that an important shift
of emphasis has taken place in antitrust theory as the ill effects of price
discrimination have become a focal point of thought and discussion in
contrast with the previous dwelling on the desirable results of price
competition. Indeed, it has been observed that the Robinsofi-Patman
Price Discrimination Act of 1936 is "an anti-competition statute slipped
into the anti-trust laws."'
A summary of the history of federal antitrust legislation will reveal
the novel departure of the Robinson-Patman Act from previous enact-
ments. The 188o's witnessed the ir~petuous post-war rise of "the Stand-
ard Oil Magnates, Coal Barons, Railroad Kings, Sugar Trust Operators,
Steel and Iron Combiners."2 The farmers and laborers of the country
demanded relief from the "oppression" of the gigantic manufacturing
corporations which were a new feature of industrial civilization 3 At
that time the sole interest of the supporters of antitrust legislation was
the curbing of monopolies to avoid unnaturally enhanced or depressed
prices. To meet this end the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of i8go was
passed; and, it might be added, in many respects this Act was merely a
hasty sop to discontented rural and working classes with Congress giv-
ing very slight attention to the probable effect of this important statute.
4
*Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
2Learned and Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Ex-
pectations (1937), 15 Hairv. Bus. Rev. 137, 139.
2 Thomas E. Watson, The People's Party Campaign Book (1892), 42.
3 Thus a group of farmers in Mecklenburg County, Virginia, resolved: "We re-
spectfully demand of our senators and representatives in Congress to use their best
efforts to enact some laws to protect the farmers in the Bright Tobacco Belt from
the oppression of the American Tobacco Company." National Economist, Washing-
ton, D. C., January 23, 1892.
4II Beard & Beard, Rise of American Civilization (1930), 327. There seems even
to have been some doubt concerning the desire of the Senate committee to draft a
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There followed a period of relative inactivity in the enforcement of
the Sherman Act. Only nineteen antitrust suits were instituted by the
federal government during the first decade after i8go.5 Setbacks at the
hands of the court6 together with the long depression of the Nineties
temporarily nullified the statute. Not until the early 19oo's was there
a sustained effort by the Department of Justice to segment monopolis-
tic enterprises and to enforce price competition. In these years the
practicable statute. Bumphrey, Authorship of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law (Cin-
cinnati 1912). Senator Sherman, nominal author of the Act, on March 21, i8go, re-
vealed his interest in preventing the stifling of competition by combinations suffi-
ciently powerful to control the price: "The sole object of such a combination is to
make competition impossible. It can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will
best promote its selfish interests, reduce price in a particular locality and break down
competition and advance prices at will where competition does not exist." 21 Cong.
Rec. 2457.
1The following table was submitted to the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee by Wendell Berge, Special Assistant to the Attorney General. Hearing before
a sub-committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2719, 7 6th Congress,



























ANTITRUST SUITS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Year Instituted Terminated Calendar Year Instituted Te
... . .. 1915 .............. 8
... 1 1916 .......... 2
3 2 1917 ............ 23
2 1 1918. ......... 11
7 3 1919 .............. 3
1 2 1920 .......... 10
3 1 1921 ............. 26
2 1 1922 ............ 22
.. 4 1923 ............ 12
1 4 1924 ............ 15
.. 1 925 ............ 15
.... 1926 .......... 12
3 1 1927 ............ 14
2 1 1928 .......... 21
1 1 1929 ............ 13
5 1 1930 .......... 11
.... 13 3 1931 .............. 3
.... 12 8 1932 ............ 3
8 3 1933 .............. 7
3 4 1934 .......... 11
.... 16 9 1935 ............ 10
.... 25 0 1936 .......... 4
.... 22 66 1937 ............ 10
26 26 1938 .......... 11




























*1932-1939 figures are on fiscal year basis.
6E. g-., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. i. (1895).
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"trust-busting" efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt were directed
against the tobacco trust, the Standard Oil Company and other massive
producers.
By 1914 demand had arisen for an amendment or for further legis-
lation clarifying the generalities of the Sherman Act. Woodrow Wilson
recognized this sentiment in a message to Congress on January 20, 1914:
"Nothing hampers business like uncertainty. Nothing daunts
or discourages it like the necessity to take chances, to run the risk
of falling under the condemnation of the law before it can make
sure just what the law is."7
The Clayton Act was the outgrowth of this demand. In this Act the
term "price discrimination" first appeared in the federal statutes. It is
abundantly clear that the prohibition of certain discriminations in price
was inserted to prevent the price cutting tactics used by many manu-
facturers to destroy competition in a particular area in order to obtain
a monopoly in that area.8 A price discrimination was not illegal under
the Clayton Act unless the effect of such discrimination was to establish
a monopoly or substantially lessen competition. 9 The emphasis still re-
mained on the paramount importance of preventing monopolies or
combinations in restraint of trade, first among producers and secondly
751 Cong. Rec. 1963 (January 20, 1914). President Taft had also expressed this
sentiment: "I am inclined to the opinion that the time is near at hand for an amend-
ment of the Anti-Trust Law, defining in greater detail defaults against it, and its
aim, and making dearer the distinction between lawful agreements, reasonably re-
straining trade, and those which are pernicious in effect." Quoted in (193o) 147 An-
nals of American Academy of Political and Social Science 33. Contrast the statement
of Gilbert H. Montague in Handler, The Federal Anti-Trust Laws: A Symposium
(1932) 29: "What embarrasses business is more frequently not the uncertainty of the
law but the certainty that, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the law stands
squarely across the path of many greatly desired trade arrangements."
"Senator Reed, referring to the bill which became the Clayton Act and speaking
on September a9 , 1914: "What is section 2? It is brought forward here as a remedy
for the existing evil of local price-cutting. The common practice indulged in by very
great and wealthy concerns is to go into a trade territory where there is competition
and drop the price of an article below the cost of production. In a little while its
competitors have been absolutely driven into bankruptcy or forced to quit the field.
Thereupon the great concern proceeds to advance the price on that same community
and recoup itself for all losses. In the meantime, without the ultimate loss of a penny,
it has established a monopoly in that country, State, or neighborhood by driving out
all competitors." 51 Cong. Rec. 15857. The different meaning attached to "price dis-
crimination" in the Clayton Act and in the Robinson-Patman Act makes somewhat
misleading such a title as Hamilton and Loevinger, The Second Attack on Price Dis-
crimination (1937), 22 Wash. Univ. L. Rev. 153. It is interesting to note that in 1914,
Congressman Stevens of New Hampshire introduced a bill "To prevent discrimina-
tion in prices and to provide for publicity of prices to dealers and to the public."
H. R. 13305 , 63rd Congress, 2d Session.
OLipson v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 76 F. (2d) 213, 218 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935).
1939]
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among distributors. And the approved means of preventing monopoly
appeared to be, broadly speaking, the requirement by law of price com-
petition.
Also in 1914 the Federal Trade Commission Act 10 was passed. There
was no further federal antitrust legislation until 1936. Yet, during this
period important interpretations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts were
had from the courts." These interpretations were necessarily limited in
scope, however, and in many instances conflicting, so that throughout
the entire field of antitrust application there still remained wide areas
of doubt.' 2 Only one situation could be said to be dearly illegal beyond
any possibility of doubt: combination or agreement by competitors to
fix or maintain prices.13 Price competition throughout the Twenties re-
mained at least the verbal focal point of all antitrust activity, whatever
deviations there may have been from this ideal in actual pricing
policies.
As the depression of 1929 and subsequent years settled down, new
attention was directed to the effect of antitrust laws on business poli-
des. President Hoover suggested the need for further study, and im-
plicit in his suggestion was a belief that possibly competition, through
price and otherwise, was not an unqualified good.14 Under the National
"1Act of September 26, 1914, 38 Stat. 717, 15 U..S. C. Sec. 41. The Federal Trade
Commission Act was passed shortly before the Clayton Act. Henderson, The Federal
Trade Commission (1924) 16-48, describes the interrelation of the two statutes.
1 E. g., the important series of cases dealing with the activities of trade associa-
tions. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921); Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective
Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925); Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297
U. S. 553 (1936). Nelson, Open Price Associations (1923); Federal Trade Commission,
Open-Price Trade Associations, Sen. Doc. No. 226, 7oth Cong., 2d Sess. (1929).
". .. the rule of reason, long considered essential in administering the Sher-
man Act .... makes sharpiy defined standards impossible." United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 23 F. SUPP. 937, 938-939 (W. D. Wis. 1938). "It is evident that while the dis-
tinctions between lawful and unlawful activities may be quite clear in theory, it is
not always easy in practice to determine whether the trader has kept within the
bounds of his privilege." United States v. Eth~l Gasoline Corp., 27 F. Supp. 959, 964
(S. D. N. Y. 1939)-
"United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927). See also Federal
Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Assn.,'273 U. S. 52 (1926); Lynch v.
Magnavox Co., 94 F. (2d) 883, 891 (C. C. A. 9 th, g,8). Compare United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., io5 F. (2d) 8o9 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1939), infra n. 72. Jaffe and
Tobriner, The Legality of Price-Fixing Agreements (1932), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1164.
"'Speech by President Hoover in December, 193o, quoted in Note (1932) 45 Harv.
L. Rev. 566: "The people have a vital interest in the conservation of our natural re-
sources; in the prevention of wasteful practices; in conditions of destructive compe-
tition which may impoverish the producer and the wage earner, and they have an
equal interest in maintaining adequate competition. I therefore suggest that an in-
[Vol. I
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Industrial Recovery Act's the first clear legislative departure from the
theory of the Sherman Act took place, for
"The N. R. A. expressed the change which had come over
men's thinking when it permitted corporations to combine in
order to eliminate 'unreasonable' competition. The profit mo-
tive, which at one time was a respectable justification for any
sort of price cutting, had become a somewhat immoral thing be-
cause of the competing symbol of cooperation."16
Within the space of a very few weeks important industries adapted
themselves to the new order of cooperation. Chiseling and price-cutting
smacked of the illegal; and filed prices, with penalties for deviation
from such prices, were encouraged.' 7 The economic desirability of in-
dustrial self-regulation of prices is a matter over which there will be ar-
gument for many years; but even before the Schechter decision there
had come a widespread dissatisfaction with both the freedom and the
restraints of the new order.' s
Following the N. R. A., the return to the older system of enforced
competition was perhaps somewhat gradual; but after May 25, 1935, in
legal contemplation the Sherman and Clayton Acts again governed
business policies.' 9 Again price competition was the legislative com-
mand.
quiry be directed especially to the effect of the anti-trust laws to determine if these
evils can be remedied without sacrifice of the fundamental purpose of these laws."
'Act of June 16, 1933, 49 Stat. 195.
"Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (1938) 227.
rrerborgh, Price Control Devices in NRA Codes (Brookings Institution 1934). In
a suit involving the Code of Fair Competition for the Cleaning and Dyeing Trade
Judge Knox wrote: "And who can rightly say, with assurance, that governmental
price fixing, when confined to transactiois in interstate commerce, is not a means
reasonably adapted to the legitimate ends which Congress seeks to serve?" United
States v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners, 6 F. Supp. 725, 732 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
'6For example, Charles A. Beard has recently attacked the revival of antitrust
sentiment in The Anti-Trust Racket (Sept. 21, 1938) , 96 New Republic 184: "We
have the knowledge, the skills and the resources required for at least doubling the
present annual output of wealth. To accomplish this speeding up there must be, at
this stage of the development, close cooperation among those elements in the spheres
of capital, labor, agriculture and government that recognizes the basic facts in the
situation and the fundamental nature of the problem-the problem of raising our
production of wealth to the highest possible level. If we can cast off the entangle-
ments of the old anti-trust claptrap and get competent minds concentrated upon the
solution of the problem, I am convinced we can find a way, not to Utopia but to a
far higher standard of life and civilization than we now have.'"
"OSection 5 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, provided: "While
this title is in effect (or in the case of a license, while section 4(a) is in effect) and for
sixty days thereafter, any code, agreement, or license approved, prescribed, or issued
and in effect tinder this title, and any action complying with the provisions thereof
1939]
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In June, 1936, the Robinson-Patman Act20 was placed on the statute
books. The principal portion of this Act was in the form of an amend-
ment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act, which prohibited certain forms
of price discrimination. Its genesis lay in the hostility of independent
wholesale and retail grocers and druggists to the chain store method of
distribution. Yet the Act, on the naive assumption that universality
is a prerequisite to constitutionality, was drafted to cover all business
and industry affecting interstate commerce.
21
Shortly thereafter the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Law22 was enacted
as a rider to other important legislation. A volte-face on the legality of
resale price maintenance took place.23 Under the protection afforded by
taken during such period, shall be exempt from the provisions of the anti-trust laws
of the United States." This section seems to have been considered in only one judicial
opinion where it was said that under the circumstances "It is idle also for the de-
fendants to argue that the anti-trust laws are tolled by the N. I. R. A .. " National
Foundry Co. v. Alabama Pipe Co., 7 F. Supp. 823, 824 (E. D. N. Y. 1934). However,
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Socony
Vacuum Oil Co., io5 F. (2d) 8og (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), placed considerable reliance on
the effect of the Code of Fair Competition which governed the oil industry. It is in-
teresting to note that the Secretary of the Interior, speaking in September, 1933, said,
"Our task is to stabilize the oil industry upon a profitable basis."
2'Act of June ig, 1936, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1937). Mr. H. B. Tee-
garden, counsel for the United States Wholesale Grocers Association, drafted the bill
introduced by Congressman Patman. Ellison, Robinson-Patman Act: Its Political and
Commercial Background, Conference Proceedings-on Robinson-Patman Anti-Dis-
crimination Act, 4 (Trade Association Executives in New York City, 1936).
21Senator Logan, 8o Cong. Rec. 6429 (1936).
"Act of August 17, 1937, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U. S. C. Sec. 1, as amended. Missouri,
Texas and the District of Columbia do not have legislation legalizing resale price
agreements.
2rhe Miller-Tydings Act reverses the judicial policy as expressed in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 407 (1911); Standard Sanitary Manu-
facturing Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine
Co., 243 U. S. 490 (1917). Cf. United States v. Colgate, 25o U. S. 3o0 (1919). See Legis-
lative Note, Resale Price Maintenance: The Miller-Tydings Enabling Act (1937), 51
Harv. L. Rev. 336; Note, The Amendment to the Federal Antitrust Laws (1938), 26
Geo. L. J. 403. Welch Grape Juice Co. v. Frankford Grocery Co., decided by Pennsyl-
vania Court of Common Pleas, September 7, 1939, construed the Robinson-Patman
Act not to invalidate differentials between wholesalers and retailers in resale price
contracts protected by the Miller-Tydings Act: "It is evident that Congress did not
contemplate a construction of the Robinson-Patman Act which would create an ir-
reconcilable conflict between it and its contemporary enactment and defeat the pri-
mary objective of the Fair Trade laws." The argument in favor of resale price main-
tenance is well summarized in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, North Carolina Supreme
Court, September 27, 1939: "The common law emphasis on forestalling, regrating,
engrossing and conspiracy to raise prices must not lead us to infer that the sole ob-
jective of public policy was to obtain the lowest possible price to the consumer on
every commodity. This is both an economic fallacy and a misconception of law. The
public is more interested in fair and reasonable prices which preserve the economic
balance in advantages to all those engaged in the trade, with due regard to the con-
[Vol. I
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this Act, all but two states have enacted statutes permitting resale price
maintenance, and the manufacturer of a standard trade-marked article
is now enabled to determine the price of that article throughout its sub-
sequent history. With this vertical control in the hands of the producer,
price competition among producers would appear of even greater pub-
lic concern than formerly.
Price discrimination is the theme of the Robinson-Patman Act. But
it is with a new purpose that the phrase is used. For the first time, in-
terest is centered on the effect of price discrimination on "competition
between rival methods of distribution," 24 i. e., on the buyers. The effect
of the Act upon competition among sellers was not considered by Con-
gress and has not been fully considered at any subsequent time.25 It is
the purpose of this paper to suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act runs
counter to traditional antitrust theories, and that the stressing of the
harmful effects of price discrimination has resulted, and may further
result, in an unintended but very real diminution of price conpetition.
Economic data, pro and con, is lacking; so the lawyer's methods-logical
analysis, precedent and authority-seem appropriate to the building
and fortification of this suggestion.
It is believed that this subject is one which should properly be con-
sidered at the present time, not only because the judicial interpretation
of the Robinson-Patman Act is stiF in the formative stage where a clear
presentation of the effects of the Act may influence the clarity (and
gloss) given by the judges to the vagueness of its language,26 but also be-
suming public, than it is in securing the lowest obtainable prices, when the inevitable
tendency is to degrade or drive from the market 'articles which it is assumed to be
desirable that the public should be able to get.'"
21The Robinson-Patman Act in Action (1937), 46 Yale L. J. 447, 449, a very help-
ful note. See also the following notes: The Robinson-Patman Act: Some Prospective
Problems of Construction and Constitutionality (1936), 50 Harv. L. Rev. 'o6; The
'Legality of Discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act (1936), 36 Col. L. Rev.
1285; Changes in Federal Price Discrimination Law Effected by the Robinson-Patman
Act (1936), 23 Va. L. Rev. 201, 316; The Robinson-Patman Act (1937), 85 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 3o6; Marketing under the Robinson-Patman Act (1937), 31 Ill. L. Rev. 907. Nu-
merous books and articles have also been written on the Robinson-Patman Act, and
will be cited from time to time. See especially The Robinson-Patman Act (The Wash-
ington Post, 1936); Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price Laws (1937);
%Verne, Business and the Robinson-Patman Law: A Symposium (1938).
2'Probably the most extended and helpful treatment of this phase of the Act is
found in the June, 1937, issue of Law and Contemporary Problems, which is devoted
to Price Discrimination and Price Cutting.
OThe conflict which this article suggests exists between the Sherman Act and the
Robinson-Patman Act, if properly presented to the courts, should raise interesting
problems of construction and extent of application. Willenbucher, The Robinson-
Patman Anti-Price Discrimination Act, (Washington 1937), 61. Landis, A Note on
"Statutory Interpretation" (1930), 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886.
19391
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cause of the present study of the national economy being conducted by
the Temporary National Economic Committee. The Committee was
charged with the duty of making "A full and complete study and inves-
tigation with respect to . . .monopoly and the concentration of eco-
nomic power in and financial control over production and distribu-
tion of goods and services.. ." The Committee was further directed to
determine
"(i) the causes of such concentration and control and their
effect upon competition; (2) the effect of the existing price sys-
tem and the price policies of industry upon the general level of
trade, upon employment, upon long-term profits, and upon con-
sumption; and (3) the effect of existing tax, patent, and other
Government policies upon competition, price levels, unemploy-
ment, profits, and consumption; ..."27
There is also, at the present time, an almost feverish activity on the
part of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, with more
. antitrust suits instituted in the last six months than in any comparable
period since the passage of the Sherman Act. To date the Department
of Justice has rather cavalierly snubbed the Robinson-Patman Act; 28
but the Federal Trade Commission issues complaints almost daily
charging violations of the Robinson-Patman Act and of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (and not infrequently alleged infractions of the
two Acts are joined in one complaint).29
The Temporary National Economic Committee, established by a resolution of
June 16, 1938, 52 Stat. 705, has heard very little discussion of the Robinson-Patman
Act at its hearings, and the only specific mention of the Act on the agenda is under
item 2o--"Small Business." Statement by Senator O'Mahoney, August 1o, 1939. One
witness has told the Committee that the price of glass bottles increased about the
time of the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. I Verbatim Report of Temporary
National Economic Committee (TNEG) 274. Dr. Ruth W. Ayres, an economist rep-
resenting consumer interests, criticized the recent price legislation and regretted
that there is "no adequate data to show how these laws are working." III TNEC 291.
Mr. Robert L. Davison, an authority on housing, charged that the Robinson-Patman
Act stood in the way of low-cost housing. IV TNEC 567. There have also been some
references to the Act in the recent steel hearings. Judge Davis of the Federal Trade
Commission explained to the Committee the method adopted by the Commission to
answer inquiries regarding the application of teh Act, II TNEC 278, and at another
point said that the Commission had insufficient funds to enforce the Act. II TNEG
239.
29No criminal prosecution has been instituted under Section 3 of the Robinson-
Patman Act (the criminal section which was formerly the Borah-Van Nuys Bill), al-
though the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice makes extensive use of
the criminal sections of the Sherman Act in its efforts to secure consent decrees. For
a discussion of the effect of a consent decree in an antitrust case see Donovan and
McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws (1933) ,
46 Harv. L. Rev. 885-
"See Appendix to this article for a list of complaints issued under the Robinson-
[Vol. I
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The current "anti-monopoly" drive is marked not so much by the
purely legalistic search for agreements in restraint of trade or efforts to
break down bigness per se (as during the earlier periods referred to),
but rather by an economic approach which seeks to penetrate to the
root of the evil. There is a genuine desire in Washington today to find
out what the restraints are which prevent prices of manufactured goods
from fluctuating more widely in accordance with the law of supply and
demand.3 0 It is felt that in times of slack business, manufacturers, in-
stead of reducing their prices to a point where they can maintain a sat-
isfactory volume of sales, tend to hold up their prices and cut down
drastically on production. This policy, according to the theory widely
held in Washington, is highly deflationary and tends to accentuate and
prolong periods of depression.31 If prices are held up and volume cur-
Patman Act. Complaints alleging a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, which declares unlawful "unfair methods of competion," have been is-
sued under circumstances which seem also to involve a violation of the Sharman Act.
Henderson in The Federal Trade Commission (1924) 322 questions the jurisdiction
of the Commission to issue orders against a price-fixing combination: ". . . upon
what theory a concerted movement to refrain from competing in certain respects is
a method of competition at all, is not stated. None of these cases have found their
way into the courts, and it does not seem that they are to be taken very seriously."
Yet Chairman Robert E. Freer, addressing the annual convention of the National
Wholesale Druggists' Association, on SeRtember 27, 1939, remarked: "The past year
has also been important to the Commission because of the number and scope of pro-
ceedings involving combination to fix prices and restrain competition, in addition
to the Robinson-Patman and Wheeler-Lea Act activities during the fiscal year, six-
teen complaints were issued charging combinations and conspiracies to fix prices or
eliminate competition." Perhaps greater clarification of the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission and the Antitrust Division should be recommended by the TNEC.
3OFormer Attorney General Homer Cummings in a letter to the President dated
April 26, 1937 urged that "the time has come for the Federal government to under-
take a restatement of the law designed to prevent monopoly and unfair competition.
This proceeds from the conviction that the present laws have not operated to give
adequate protection to the public against monopolistic practices." Solicitor General
(then Assistant Attorney General) Jackson also discussed the problem in his annual
report for 1937: "The antitrust laws have become theological tracts on corporate
morality .... The attitude of seeking for a sinister intent rather than appraising the
effect of combinations on prices has led to a procedure which makes antitrust prose-
cutions so cumbersome that only a few prosecutions are possible.... Correspondence,
secret dealings, completely irrelevant from the point of view of the effect of the busi-
ness activity under consideration, become the whole issue of the case."
31See e. g., the remarks of Chairman Freer of the Federal Trade Commission be-
fore the National Petroleum Association, April 13, 1939: "There has been much writ-
ten recently about 'imperfect' competition. The classic .concept of competition con-
templates more or less sensitive prices, affected by the so-called laws of supply and
demand. This concept contemplates no artificial controls either by government or by
private individuals or groups of individuals. ... In many industries, prices have be-
come 'sticky' and tend to remain uniform and rigid in the face of changing demand
and of improvements in the processes of manufacture and distribution." Industrial
1939]
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tailed as demand dries up, men are thrown out of work, purchasing
power destroyed, and a vicious deflationary cycle inaugurated. If, on the
other hand, prices of manufactured goods are reduced as demand slack-
ens, in most industries sales volume can be held up, not to boom-time
levels, of course, but to normal proportions, and employment can be
maintained.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the various factors which
enter into the determination of prices of standardized manufactured
goods, and to point out in what respects the Robinson-Patman Act, as
one of such factors, tends to hold up such prices in times of slack busi-
ness and also to produce price uniformity throughout an industry.
FACTORS DETERMINING PRICES
By way of introduction to a discussion of the factors entering into
the determination of the prices of standardized manufactured articles,
it would be well to consider the factors which determine commodity
prices on an exchange, such as the Chicago Board of Trade. In the
wheat pit of the Chicago Board of Trade there are a large number of
buyers bidding for wheat and a large number of sellers seeking to sell
wheat.32 Complete publicity attends all of their transactions. Their bid
and asked prices are a matter of common knowledge, and when a buyer
and a seller succeed in agreeing on a price, say of $i.oo, such price is
immediately posted for all other buyers and sellers to see. As a result of
such price publicity, at the moment of sale $1.oo is the price of wheat in
that market. At such a time no buyer is going to bid $i.o 5 , and no seller
is going to ask 95c when they have just seen wheat sold at $I.oo. Of
course, the price may ultimately reach $i.05 if the buyers become con-
vinced that no more wheat is going to be offered for less than that, or
it may ultimately reach 95c if the sellers become convinced that no
buyer is going to bid more than that. But at or about the time of sale
the market price of wheat is $1.oo. This is known as the principle of the
single price. Reduced to simple terms it means that in the case of an in-
terchangeable article or commodity of ihe same quality, given complete
publicity as to actual prices paid, as well as bid and asked prices, at any
given time and in a single market there will be only one price for such
Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility, Sen. Doc. 13, 74th Cong., ist Sess.; Humphrey,
The Nature and Meaning of Rigid Prices (1937). 45 J. Pol. Econ. 651; Means, Notes
on Inflexible Prices (1936) 26 Am. Econ. Rev. (Supp.) 23, 35; Galbraith. Monopoly
Power and Price Rigidities (1936), 50 Q. J. Econ. 456.
2Even on a commodity exchange the Sherman Act may be violated, an example
being the cornering of the grain market of the Chicago Board of Trade, Peto v.
Howell, toi F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1938).
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article or commodity.3 3 The principle operates perfectly, however, only
under conditions of widespread knowledge. If, in the wheat pit, for ex-
ample, little groups of men gather at different points, each bargaining
privately for the purchase and sale of wheat, and keeping quiet after-
wards about the prices reached, it is perfectly obvious that the price in
one such group might be $1.03, in another 98c, in another 95c, and so
on, depending on how many groups there were.
The only type of market in which are found all of the factors neces-
sary for the perfect operation of the single price principle is an ex-
change, such as the Chicago Board of Trade. In no other type of mar-
ket is complete price information transmitted instantaneously to all
buyers and sellers.3 4
The same principle applies, although to a much more limited ex-
tent, in the sale of many types of standardized, interchangeable, manu-
factured articles. Most manufacturers of such articles put out a so-called
list price for their products. This generally consists of a formal cata-
logue or a pamphlet, or sometimes simply a single sheet of paper, which
is widely distributed throughout the industry to- wholesale and retail
customers, to trade periodicals, and often to competitors.35 When
manufacturers publish a list price it is usually their hope to sell their
products at such price. A considerable portion of the time they are not
successful in this regard, however, and normal competitive pressures
tend to drive actual prices down from list prices. Because the list prices
of various manufacturers of a standardized, interchangeable article are
published, and hence widely known, the single price principle comes
into operation (although not perfectly), and such list prices tend to be
uniform.
nThis principle is sometimes known as Say's law.
"In the Sugar Institute case the court was much interested in the "waiting pe-
riod" during which information concerning price changes was circulated throughout
the industry. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936) modifying 15
F. Supp. 817 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
81Under the N. R. A., price lists were not only published but also filed with the
Code Authority. Many people viewed the Robinson-Patman Act as an invitation to
return to such a system. Mr. Jacob K. Javits describes the effect of the Recovery Act:
"The open publication of prices eliminated a great many inside buying advantages
which had theretofore been enjoyed by some favored buyers, and served to stabilize
the price for all sellers and all buyers at the economic level then necessitated by the
market. The Robinson-Patman Act was considered when passed as likely again to en-
courage price publication; and it has had that effect. Manifestly a price list definitely
indicates the price charged and may be submitted as evidence of what the price ac-
tually was. It saves the seller from the importunities of buyers as the seller may then
state that he has broadcast his prices to the world and therefore cannot deviate in a
particular sale. Price publication is really a hostage to compliance with the Robinson-
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Take a hypothetical example of how the single price principle might
operate in a freely competitive market to make uniform the list prices
of different manufacturers of a standardized, interchangeable article.
Let us say that the current market price of screwdrivers is $1.oo. Busi-
ness is in a period of brisk demand and orders for screwdrivers are pour-
ing in faster than they can be filled. Company A, one of the important
members of the industry,36 decides the opportunity is ripe to try to get
a better return on its screwdrivers and raises its list and actual price to
i.io. Thereupon, one of two things is bound to happen in the indus-
try. Either A's competitors, eager to increase their profits, follow the
lead of A, in which event a new price level is produced, or they refuse
to follow such lead and A is forced to abandon its new price and fall
back to its old one of $i.oo. In the latter event, A would either cancel
its new list and return to its old, or would simply disregard it and sell
at $i.oo. Sooner or later, however, if A's competitors did not raise their
prices to $1.io, A would revise its price list to $i.oo, the actual market
price, and thus restore the uniformity.
In the converse situation, i. e., where Company A publishes a new
price of goc, there is no alternative open as to what happens in the
screwdriver industry. All of the other manufacturers are compelled to
meet A's price, or retire from the market. For A's competitors, as a mat-
ter purely of business survival, cannot and will not sit idly by and watch
A take away their customers. Obyiously no purchaser of screwdrivers is
Patman Act." Werne, Business and the Robinson-Patman Law: A Symposium (1988)
209.
36The leadership principle in industrial pricing is a recognized economic fact.
One economist terms it the "follow-the-leader" method of pricing. Holtzclaw, The
Principles of Marketing (1935) 6oi. Assistant Attorney General (then Professor) Thur-
man Arnold has described the ordinary occurrence: "Thus the phenomenon known
as 'price leadership' became the dominant factor in establishing control on the part
of great organizations. If men refused to follow the practices of the recognized and
respected members of their industry, they were regarded as 'chislers' ". Arnold, The
Folklore of Capitalism (1937) 227. This practice is not illegal aside from any agree-
ment to follow the leader, and Assistant A4torney General (now Solicitor Gen-
eral) Jackson in his 1937 report cites United States v. International Harvester, 274
U. S. 693, 709 (1927) for the proposition that, under the decisions, price leadership
"does not establish any suppression of competition or any sinister domination....
Indeed, the maintenance of high prices by a combination which completely dominates
the market may be held to be a sign of virtue. It was held to be a sign of merit that
the International Harvester Company had not indulged in price cutting." Also in
Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 605
(1925) the Supreme Court recognized that "Variations of price by one manufacturer
are usually promptly followed by variation throughout the trade." Yet price leader-
ship may have the same effect as an agreement to fix and maintain prices, and this
economic fact should be weighed in evaluating the Robinson-Patman Act and the




going to pay $1.oo when he knows, and ex hypothesi he does know be-
cause A's price has been published and distributed throughout the
trade, that he can buy screwdrivers for goc.
Thus, we see that the tendency in the case of standardized, inter-
changeable manufactured articles is for published list prices to be uni-
form.3 7 It is only a tendency, and not an inviolable rule, however, be-
cause knowledge of list prices is not distributed instantaneously to all
buyers in the market, and because several factors in addition to price
enter into the purchase and sale of manufactured articles.
The next question to be considered is whether, if the tendency is
for list prices of standardized, interchangeable, manufactured articles
to be uniform, a similar tendency exists in the case of actual prices. Not
necessarily so. List prices do, of course, affect actual prices, particularly
in times of good business, but so many other factors normally enter in
to tend to make actual prices divergent that the tendency to conform
is far weaker than in the case of list prices. 3s In this connection.it should
be noted that there is a marked difference in the strength of the tend-
ency in times of brisk demand and in times of slack demand. In times
of brisk demand, bidding is active and actual prices tend to rise. No
manufacturer can hope to sell above his list price, however, so the re-
sult is that the list price, so long as it remains unchanged, acts as a ceil-
ing on rising prices. Thus, if the period of brisk demand is sufficiently
active, or lasts long enough, actual prices will coincide with list prices
and, because list prices tend to be uniform, will be substantially identi-
cal in any particular market.
In periods of slack demand, on the other hand, bidding is inactive
and manufacturers are under compulsion to sell, even at a loss, in order
to cover their overhead.39 Buyers, aware of this compulsion, make
tempting offers at prices below the list. Sooner or later a manufacturer
yields to this pressure and starts shading his price. This shading does
not, however, consist of a uniform cut of say 5% to all customers, be-
cause such a cut would be promptly known by the entire industry and
'TIn view of this natural uniformity of list prices it may be questioned whether
the mere juxtaposition of identical price lists is any evidence of a conspiracy or agree-
ment to fix prices in an industry. Compare A Statement of the Substantive Law of
Restraint of Trade, Monopoly, and Unfair Competition, prepared by the United
States Treasury Department for the use of the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee, page 22 (1939).
rill, The Fiction of the Quoted Price (1937) 4 Law and Contemp. Prob. 363.
c"The compulsion to grant a special price in order to augment the volume of
business is especially acute in industries requiring a heavy capital investment. Mar-
keting under the Robinson-Patman Act (1937), 31 Ill. L. Rev. 907, 920.
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would defeat its own purpose by immediately bringing down the prices
of all competing manufacturers by a like amount, thus preventing the
particular manufacturer from gaining any advantage over his competi-
tors.40 What each manufacturer hopes to accomplish is to increase his
own sales at the expense of his competitors by offering a more favorable
price. In order to obtain and maintain this hoped for advantage, the
manufacturer usually cuts his price only in individual situations, takes
considerable pains to keep his lower price a secret and asks his customer
not to divulge the deal they have made.
The result of this price cutting,4 ' in which, in the absence of legis-
lative restrictions such as those imposed by the Robinson-Patman Act,
substantially all manufacturers in most industries indulge in periods of
bad business, is complete divergence of prices, both as between com-
peting manufacturers and between different customers of the same
manufacturer. Sooner or later, if the period of slack business continues
and ripens into a depression, some manufacturer will decide that the
deterioration of prices has proceeded so far, and the departure from list
prices become so generally recognized and followed, that a new lower
list price is in order and will publish one. This new price, if the cut is
deep enough, will, according to the process outlined above, be met by
the rest of the industry. Then, if the depression continues and deepens,
the chiseling process will start all over again and sooner or later a still
lower list price will be establishpd.
It is this chiseling process, this whittling away at published prices,
which provides flexibility in the price structure of standardized, inter-
changeable, manufactured articles. If this process is eliminated, either
through agreement in violation of the Sherman Act or in any other
manner, prices in times of slack business, are going to be much slower
to come down along with falling demand.
PRICE LISTS AND THE ROBINSON-PATmAN ACr
Yet that is just the effect of the Robinson-Patman Act. This Act
provides:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indi-
"In Prairie Farmer Pub. Co. v. Indiana Farmers' Guide Pub. Co., 88 F. (2d) 979
(C. . A. 7th, 1937) the court refers to "the conflict for advantage called competition."
"Campaigned price cutting in order to destroy a rival and to establish a mo-
nopoly in a restricted area has been condemned by Congress in the original section 2
of the Clayton Act and by the courts irr United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U. S. io6 (1911) and United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S. D.
N. Y. 1916). This type of price cutting is not the same as the off-list selling or the
categorizing of customers against which the Robinson-Patman Act seems directed.
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rectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion . ."42
As administered by the Federal Trade Commission, in accordance with
the expressions of Congressional intent contained in the legislative his-
tory of the Act, it is clear that any difference in price between two com-
peting customers which is not affirmatively justifiable on one of the
grounds stated in the Act, such as savings in the cost of doing business
as between such customers, is illegal. In other words, stated in broad
terms and without reference to any of the exemptions provided in the
law, a manufacturer has to sell all of his customers who are in competi-
tion with one another at the same price. If a manufacturer obeys the
law and sells to all of his competing customers at the same price, such
price will be known by everybody throughout the trade, because no
manufacturer could conceivably keep secret the price at which he sells
all of his customers.4 3 Ahd as soon as the situation exists where'compet-
ing sellers have a single price for all of their customers, with widespread
knowledge as to such prices, the principle of the single price begins to
operate, and prices throughout the industry tend to become uniform.
Thus, in times of slack business, prices of standardized, interchange-
able, manufactured articles, due to the operation of the Robinson-
Patman Act, tend to remain at, or close to, the list price, rather than
dropping away and pulling the list price down after them, as happens
under normal, competitive conditions.
44
"An important extension of the terms of the Clayton Act is the addition of the
clause "where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially . . . to injure,
destroy or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them." Cf.
Lipson v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 76 F. (2d) 213, 218 (C. C. A. Ist, 1935); S. S. Kresge
Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); Van Camp Co. v.
American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 (1929).
"In Cement Manufacturers Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 6o4
(1925) the court recognized the uniformity which results from a known price: "Nor,
for the reasons stated, can we regard the gathering and reporting of information,
through the cooperation of the defendants in this case, with reference to production,
price of cement in actual closed specific job contracts and of transportation costs
from chief points of production in the cement trade, as an unlawful restraint of com-
merce; even though it be assumed that the result of the gathering and reporting of
such information tends to bring about uniformity in price."
"Professor Arthur R. Bums, author of The Decline of Competition (1936), writes:
"The obstruction of the development of large distributors and the elimination of
secret price cutting is likely, however, to have the general effect of strengthening
manufacturers in their efforts to maintain prices, thus reducing output and possibly
intensifying depression." Bums, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price
Competition (1937), 4 Law and Contemp. Prob. 301, 319.
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To point up this fact, let us return to our old illustration of Com-
pany A and the screwdriver industry. Let us say that business has been
good and the going price of screwdrivers throughout the industry is
$i.io, which happens also to be the published list price of most of the
manufacturers. Then business slows up and demand falls off. Customers
start dickering with the Company for price concessions. Company A
points out to them, however, that any such concessions are illegal under
the Robinson-Patman Act.45 The only course open to the Company is
to reduce its price level uniformly to all customers. This the Company
is loathe to do, however, because such a reduction would be promptly
met by its competitors and any possible price advantage would be lost.
After such a cut Company A would find itself enjoying approximately
the same volume of business as before, but at a lower profit margin, and
there is no incentive in that. Thus, in situations where the Robinson-
Patman Act is followed to the lefter, no company cuts its price until
sheer desperation drives it to do so. This comes only after business had
dried up to such an extent that a company is willing to break the mar-
ket in the effort to develop some new orders.
Let us examine some of the specific pressures resulting from the
Robinson-Patman Act which tend to force adherence to published price
lists:
i. The requirement that competing ,purchasers of goods of like
grade and quality be treated equally. This requirement, which is the
broad and therefore not altogether accurate essence of the Act, was in-
tended by the original draftsman of the Act to result in a one-price
system.
"The Act itself merely applied to wholesale distribution a
principle that long has been effective and profitable throughout
retail trade. Consumers immediately recognized the fairness and
convenience of the one-price principle when it was introduced in
the retail trade 50 years ago." 46
The difficulty of determining whenpurchasers are or are not com-
petitors,47 and of being certain that the various functional classifica-
IsSee n. 35, supra.
4"H. B. Teegarden, Don't Fear the Robinson-Patman Law (April 1937), 25 Na-
tion's Business 19. Mr. Teegarden prepared the original draft of the bill. See n. 20,
supra.
4'Several Federal Trade Commission complaints have been directed toward a so-
lution of the problem of what persons are in competition, but as yet there have been
no helpful opinions by either the Commission or the courts. Certain earlier decisions.
will serve as guides. Baran v. Goodyear Tire'& Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571, 574 (S. D.
N. Y. 1919>: "There is apparently no competition between the manufacturers of tires
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tions of purchasers are not legally assailable, 48 together with the uncer-
tainty as to the breadth of interpretation which will be given to the
phrase "goods of like grade and quality" 49 all contribute to the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a single-price system.
2. The vagueness and uncertainty of interpretation of the exculpat-
ing provisions. The Act contains a number of provisos which permit de-
parture from a single-price system under particular circumstances.
Thus, to mention one such proviso, price differentials are permissible
if they "make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manu-
facture, sale, or delivery.. ." To determine what constitutes "only due
allowance" in most situations is a problem which cannot be approached
without the aid of accountants, and even then the experts are often in
disagreement as to how certain cost factors should be allocated as be-
tween different methods of manufacture or distribution.50 In fact, the
Act has been termed "An Act to restore prosperity to ... accountants"; 51
and the dealers, nor as it alleged that any exists. The differentiation in price would
not therefore substantially lessen competition." Professor Fetter, in Planning for
Totalitarian Monopoly (1937), 45 J. Pol. Econ. 95, 102, approves the definition given
by Professor Burns in The Decline of Competition (1936), 273, but criticizes the ap-
plication of the definition: "Price discrimination occurs wherever a seller sells a
homogeneous commodity at the same time to different purchasers at different prices."
the philosophy of the Robinson-Patman Act is fundamentally incompatible
with a realistic functional view of the mrrketing process." McNair, Marketing Func-
tions and Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act (1937), 4 Law and Contemp. Prob. 334,
351. Wholesaler's discounts and other functional differentials were upheld under the
Clayton Act. Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d,
1923) cert. denied 262 U. S. 759; Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat
Co., 227 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) cert. denied 266 U. S. 613. It also seems clear that
traditional functional differentials will be upheld under the Robinson-Patman Act in
large measure. Smith, The Patman Act in Practice (1937), 35 Mich. L. Rev. 705, 724.
Zorn and Feldman, Business under the New Price Laws (1937) 174. Mr. Allen C.
Phelps, attorney for the Federal Trade Commission, speaking before the National
Association of Retail Grocers, June 19, 1939: "It is generally considered that it rec-
ognizes the validity and propriety of functional discounts."
"It has been suggested that the "like grade and quality" proviso may accomplish
a nullification of the Act. The Legality of Discrimination under the Robinson-
Patman Act (1936), 36 Col. L. Rev. 1285, 1292.
5"Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to
such purchasers sold or delivered." Harbeson, Costs and Economic Control (1939),
17 Harv. Bus. Rev. 257, 265 suggests, "There is great danger that, because of the dif-
ficulty of justifying price differentials on the basis of cost, the effect of this provision
will be further to encourage one-price policies, price rigidity, and chronic excess
capacity."
mChairman Robert E. Freer of the Federal Trade Commission speaking on "Ac-
counting Problems under the Robinson-Patman Act," March 24, 1938.
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but even the most elaborate cost accounting analysis may fail to satisfy
the Commission.52 The simplicity of the one-price system is made more
inviting by the accounting difficulties which plague the adoption of an
alternative.
Another exculpating proviso permits price changes from time to
time "in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the
marketability of the goods concerned." 3 It will take numerous decisions
by the Commission and by the courts to explain the meaning of this
clause.5 4 Perhaps there can be changes in the market, even of manufac-
tured articles, from hour to hour; but it is clear that the framers of the
Act did not foresee such volatile market conditions and did not intend
to permit so easy a defense. Already this clause has been involved in one
case in which the court required the defendant to state in his answer
the facts which the defendant claimed constituted changing conditions
in the market.55
51 1n the Matter of Standard Brands, FTC Docket No. 2986.
51It is said that this clause was included as "an added precaution." H. Rept. No.
2287, 74th Cong., ist Sess., 11 (1936).
"Congressman Celler: "The courts will have the devil's own job to unravel the
tangle." 8o Cong. Rec. 9561 (June 15, 1936). In this connection there might be con-
sidered again the suggestion "that there should be established a Federal Agency with
power to inquire into, consider, and determine in advance the legality of industrial
consolidations, or trade agreements affecting competition." Donovan, Some Practical
Aspects of the Sherman Law (1929), 3 Temp. L. Q. 343. The same proposal is made
in Tobriner and Jaffe, Revision of the Anti-Trust Laws (1932), 20 Calif. L. Rev. 585,
and by Mr. Thurlow M. Gordon in Werne, Business and the Robinson-Patman Law:
A Symposium (1938) 65. Another writer has criticized this advance approval on the
ground that it would "permit the cartels of Germany without the public control of
industrial cartels which exists in Germany." Clark, The Federal Trust Problem
(1931) 291. The history of the Sugar Institute illustrates the difficulties which may
arise. See opinion of Judge Mack, United States v. Sugar Institute, Inc., 15 F. Supp.
817 (S. D. N. Y. 1934). Judge Davis of the Federal Trade Commission described to the
Temporary National Economic Committee the practice followed by the Commission
in the wave of questions and inquiries after the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act.
II TNEC 278 (March 3, 1939): ". . . as it was a new law, the Commission took the
liberty and the responsibility of establishing a committee of some of its best lawyers
and economists and accountants who had perihission to informally discuss the prob-
lems with the innumerable members of industry who were pouring in there to try
to get their bearings, and right in that connection, for several weeks, I think, the
Secretary reported to us we received an average of four hundred letters a day, making
inquiry about the Robinson-Patman Act, and so forth. So we authorized this com-
mittee to be as helpful as they could, not to get out on a limb or in deep water, be-
cause it was new to everybody and in the final analysis the courts had their say as
to interpretation, and, in addition there, the Department of Justice had concurrent
jurisdiction, and we had to proceed carefully and cautiously."
5In Huber Inc. v. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co., a suit for damages under the Rob-
inson-Patman Act, Judge Goddard of the Southern District of New York, handed
down a memorandum opinion on October 5, 1939: "Demand No. i is denied insofar
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3. The burden of proving justification which is imposed on the re-
spondent. There has been some doubt as to whether the proviso which
allows a respondent to show that the lower price was "made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor,"' 6 is merely the right
to put in rebuttal evidence or is a complete defense of any charge of
illegality. In any event, the respondent must establish this defense, and
the burden is not placed on the Commission or the complainant to
show that the lower price was not given in order to meet bona fide com-
petition.
4. Industry control of prices through the Robinson-Patman pro-
-vision in Trade Practice Rules. It was early suggested that the courts
would not permit (under the Sherman Act) an industry to require its
members to live up to the Robinson-Patman Act, in other words, to act
as an enforcement agency under the new Act.57 Yet the Trade Practice
Rules approved by the Commission in the case of more than a score of
industries have contained a rule prohibiting price discrimination.
58
as it requires a statement of the sales made by defendant at prices lower than those
paid by plaintiff. However, defendant should be required to state in general the
market conditions prevailing at the time or times of the sales made to plaintiff, and
the changing conditions which affected the marketability of the flour sold to the
plaintiff and to the defendant's other customers at or between the times of such sales.
If the defense is supplemented in this nanner it will not be open to charge that it
contains merely conclusions of law. But to require a statement of the actual sales
made at lower prices than those paid by plaintiff would be to require the defendant
to furnish the plaintiff with a prima facie case which otherwise defendant might
never have had to rebut." Congressman Utterback expressed the views of the spon-
sors: "Whether price changes are of a character justified by the causes here described
is a question of fact, and where that question comes to issue, the burden of proof is
upon the offending party claiming its protection." 8o Cong. Rec. 956o (June 15, 1936).
518o Cong. Rec. 9560 (June 15, 1936). The view of the Federal Trade Commission
has been expressed In the Matter of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, FTC
Docket No. 2116: "A manufacturer may justify a discriminatory low price to a large
purchaser on the ground of meeting competition only if his competitor has previously
made an equally low and discriminating price to that purchaser." It has been sug-
gested that the defense of meeting competition should be broadly construed in order
to avoid the effect of Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1 (1927) and
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929) which held state statutes prohibit-
ing discrimination unconstitutional because this defense was not given the seller.
Changes in Federal Price Discrimination Law Effected by the Robinson-Patman Act
(1936), 23 Va. L. Rev. 316, 323. See The Robinson-Patman Act (The Washington Post
1936) 33.
it is extremely doubtful that the courts will hold that a trade association
has powers of self-regulation coextensive with the broad and unexplored implications
of the Robinson-Patman Act." Fly, The Sugar Institute Decisions and the Anti-Trust
Laws (1936), 46 Yale L. J. 228, 247. Austern, Book Review (1938), 51 Harv. L. Rev.
1313.
G'See, for example, Baby Chick Rule 35, Concrete Burial Vault Rule 13, Tomato
Paste Manufacturing Rule 13, Wet Ground Mica Rule 4.
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5. The sanction of the ever-menacing triple damage suit. A realistic
appraisal of the freezing effect of the Robinson-Patman Act on prices
must include the threat of triple damage suits.59 If no consequence
worse than a Federal Trade Commission cease and desist order were
involved, the determination of industrial price policy might not be se-
riously affected by the Act. A successful triple damage suit, however, is
a very different matter, for just one such suit might easily bankrupt
many a successful corporation. It is now suggested by Senator O'Ma-
honey, Chairman of the Temporary National Economic Committee,
that the penalties for violation of the antitrust laws should be sub-
stantially increased. Heavy penalties against officers and directors are
suggested, and S. 2719 proposes that any company violating the anti-
trust laws shall forfeit to the United States a sum equal to twice the
total net income received by such company during each month within
which any violation of the antitrust laws has occurred.60 The chilling
calm of a recent Trade Commission announcement concerning a
Robinson-Patman complaint illustrates the efficacy of the present dam-
age provisions:
"The facts were not developed because preliminary inquiries
disclosed private litigation in which the party charged was being
5fThe first triple damage suit under the Robinson-Patman Act was English v.
Nicholas Copper Co., filed on January 9, 1937, in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri on Japuary 9, 1937. One writer has called the Act
"an outrageous basis for a suit for triple damages." McLaughlin, The Courts and the
Robinson-Patman Act: Possibilities of Strict Construction (1937), 4 Law and Contemp.
Prob. 410, 413. The vagueness of the statute together with the fact that specific dam-
ages need not always be proved in antitrust cases seems to justify this comment.
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (1931); Hansen
Packing Co. v. Swift & Co., 27 F. Supp. 364, 369 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). Cf. Arthur v. Kraft-
Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1938). It is recognized that a Federal
Trade Commission order may have "serious practical results in the encouragement of
litigation, though necessarily conceding the order not to control such litigation under
the doctrine of res judicata." Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 92 F. (2d) 677, 681 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937). The Department of Justice is setting an
example in suing for three-fold damages in cases involving identical bids to the gov-
ernment. United States v. The Cooper Corpoiation, filed in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York on February 20, 1939. A Depart-
ment of Justice press release on the same day contended that "A proceeding under
Section 7 is the only form of antitrust proceeding whereby the government may re-
cover the damages it believes it has sustained by reason of the defendants' alleged
combination to fix the price of tires." It is interesting to note that the United States
is a "person," according to the contentions of the Department of Justice, when it
comes to suing for three-fold damages, but not a "person" under the Robinson-
Patman Act. 38 Opp. Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). Probably the answer is that the govern-
ment does not want to pay too much for the things it buys.
'OS. 2719, 7 6th Cong., ist Sess. Hearings on this bill, introduced by Senator
O'Mahoney, were held on July 28, 1939, before a subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary.
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sued for $15,000,000 triple damages under the Robinson-Patman
Act which suit involved the same issues. Hence the file was
closed." 61
6. The possibility that an important contract may be held void for
illegality because of violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
62
7. The criminal penalties in Section 3 of the Act.63
The perfect defense of a seller to all charges of discrimination is un-
failing adherence to a published price list. Of course, in actual litiga-
tion the seller may be able to establish justification for any departures
from such list. But the establishment of such justification is burden-
some, and it is often easier for the seller simply to adhere to his list
price. Thus, the Robinson-Patman Act does tend to enforce compliance
with published price lists. As one commentator remarked, a price list is
the best possible evidence that prices have not been discriminatory, pro-
vided that the seller can show that he charged list prices to his cus-
tomers.
4
Even the sponsors of the Robinson-Patman Act recognized the argu-
ment that the Act might be considered a price fixing bill. When asked
whether such was the correct interpretation, Congressman Patman re-
plied:
"No; it is opposed to price-fixing. Because a manufacturer
will be compelled to sell to all his customers at the same price
under the same conditions does not mean that his competitor
across the street manufacturing the same quality of merchandise
will be compelled to sell to his customers at the same price. It
will merely mean that whatever price the competing manufac-
turer across the street sells for, he must treat his own customers
fairly and sell to them at the same price basis." 65
aFederal Trade Commission, "A Brief Summary of 64 Robinson-Patman Cases,"
2 (undated).
nThere has been one holding that a contract of sale which violates the Robinson-
Patman Act is not void as the discrimination is only "collateral" to the contract.
Progress Corporation v. Green, 163 Misc. 828, 298 N. Y. S. 154 (1937) noted in (1938)
38 Col. L. Rev. 192. Compare Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902);
A. B. Small v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U. S. 248 (1925).
OThe Borah-Van Nuys bill, which became Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act,
has not yet been invoked by the Department of Justice. But these various points may
not be dismissed as a parade of imaginary horribles for they must be considered by
a careful lawyer and a cautious business man.
8t"The whole tendency of the Act is toward an open but not necessarily uniform
price. The seller will best conform to the policy of the Act by publishing his price
list, customer classification, and what services he stands ready to give or pay for."
Marketing under the Robinson-Patman Act (1937), 31 Ill. L. Rev. 907, 941.
68o Cong. Rec. 7970 (May 21, 1936). In H. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., the
same argument was made: "In conclusion, your committee wishes to correct some im-
19391
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Nearly every commentator on the Act has suggested that the Act in
practice might result in substantial elimination of price competition
among competitors on the same planes of production or distribution.
Thus Mr. James Lawrence Fly, counsel for the government in the Sugar
Institute case, pointed out that the Robinson-Patman Act may change
the law, "perhaps even to the extent of requiring the kind of price uni-
formities which have previously been attacked as restraints of trade."
66
Another writer believed that the Act might compel by law the same
rigidities of price which were objected to by critics of the NRA.67 Mr.
Blackwell Smith, who was General Counsel of the NRA, predicted that
".... henceforth, price may be used as a weapon in competition only
with the greatest circumspection." 68 He also suggests that the Act may
result in
"rigid price structures in the case of large sellers who try to con-
form to the Act (Such price set-ups, because of the necessity of
rigid interrelation of allowances, must be altered throughout, if
at all, and would result in fixity. Such a price structure results
also in uniformity between sellers, in that all must recognize and
adjust to such a structure of any competing seller who is a big
factor in the industry.)"
69
portant misapprehensions, and even misrepresentations, that have been broadly urged
with regard to the probable effect of this bill. There is nothing in it to penalize,
shackle, or discourage efficiency, or to reward inefficiency. There is nothing in it to
fix prices, or enable the fixation of prices; nor to limit the freedom of price move-
ments in response to changing market conditions." In Congress the bill was viewed
almost entirely as a measure affecting methods of retail and wholesale distribution
and not as affecting a manufacturer's prices. A dramatic illustration of the narrow-
ness of the approach is the answer of the late Senator Logan, one of the chief spon-
sors of the bill in the Senate, to an inquiry by Senator Vandenberg as to whether the
"provision was written entirely with the field of retail merchandising in mind." Sena-
tor Logan replied in the affirmative, and added, "but I had no idea, until the Senator
from Michigan mentioned it, that it had anything to do with the automobile in-
dustry." 8o Cong. Rec. 6429 (1936). An all-inclusive, generalized act was passed with-
-out considering in any respect the variety of the problems which would result, ex-
-cept in regard to the distribution of food and drugs. Congress completely disregarded
the advice that "The technologies of our various trades-meat packing, building, min-
ing, retailing, and what not-have their own cotapulsions with which schemes of pub-
lic control must come to grips. The simple uniformity of the older acts may have to
give way to an accommodation of public oversight to the varying necessity of the dif-
ferent trades." Hamilton, The Problem of Anti-Trust Reform (1932), 32 Col. L. Rev.
173, 177.
"Fly, The Sugar Institute Decisions and the Anti-Trust Laws (1936), 46 Yale
L. J. 228.
vGordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act-The Meaning of Sections
i and 3 (1936), 22 Am. Bar Assn. J. 593, 594-
OsSmith, The Patman Act in Practice (1937), 35 Mich. L. Rev. 705, 731.
"Ibid., 730. A similar view was expressed in The Robinson-Patman Act in Action
(1937), 46 Yale L. J. 447, 481: "Although the issue was never clearly presented in these
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Other writers have noted that "its general requirement that prices
be nondiscriminatory is characteristic of measures designed to control
the charges of public utilities";70 and in the Congressional debates and
reports on the Robinson-Patman bill, great reliance was placed on the
views of the Supreme Court on discrimination as stated in Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.71 A significant
distinction, perhaps, is that rates and charges of public utilities are com-
pletely regulated; while the theory of previous antitrust legislation has
been that the natural result of competition is a proper price level and
that government regulation is a harmful and disrupting influence.
Soon after this article is printed, it is expected that the United States
Supreme Court will render its decision in the Socony-Vacuum case,
7 2
terms, the Robinson-Patman Act amounts to a decision by Congress in favor of uni-
form prices against any alternative economic end. In many markets where the uni-
form prices to be enforced will be monopolistic prices, the decision amounts to a
preference for one-price monopoly against discriminatory monopoly, an, election to
which there are serious objections, both economic and social." In Changes in Federal
Price Discrimination Law Effected by the Robinson-Patman Act (1936), 23 Va. L.
Rev. 316, 323, the author of the note says: "The right to discriminate in price and
facilities to meet competition is, therefore, very limited .... This restriction gives
the Robinson-Patman Act a much greater tendency to fix prices than Section 2 of
the Clayton Act." See also McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-
Patman Act (1937), 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 321, 337. The same view was expressed
in Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 26 l. Supp. 713, 714 (E. D. Pa. 1939): "The 'one
price' policy, although now generally accepted as sound, wise and just, is of compara-
tively recent adoption. It has, however, been written into the amendments to what
we know as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U. S. C. A. Sec. i et seq., and is now the
statutory law." And in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, decided by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina on September 27, 1939, reference is made to "the Second Section of
the Robinson-Patman Amendment, standardizing prices by prohibiting discrimina-
tions."
1mMcAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey (1937), 4 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 273, 290.
12145 U. S. 263, 276 (1892): "The principal objects of the Interstate Commerce Act
were to secure just and reasonable charges for transportation; to prohibit unjust dis-
criminations in the rendition of like services under similar circumstances and condi-
tions; to prevent undue or unreasonable preferences to persons, corporations, or lo-
calities; ... It was not designed, however, to prevent competition between different
roads, or to interfere with the customary arrangements made by railway companies
for reduced fares in consideration of increased mileage, where such reduction did not
operate as an unjust discrimination against other persons traveling over the road.
In other words, it was not intended to ignore the principle that one can sell at whole-
sale cheaper than at retail. It is not all discriminations or preferences that fall within
the inhibition of the statute; only such as are unjust or unreasonable."
r'United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939),
certiorari granted by the United States Supreme Court on October 16, 1939. Justices
Black, Douglas, Frankfurter and Reed will be taking part in the first major antitrust
case since they were appointed to the Court. Judge Major in the opinion handed
down on July 27, 1939, seemed to steer nearer the Appalachian Coals case (upon
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a decision which should go far towards illuminating the present status
of price competition under the Sherman Act. Some commentators have
observed in the Appalachian Coals case7 3 a disposition by the Court to
depart from its previous inflexible denouncement, as expressed in the
Trenton Potterie7 4 decision, of any agreement by competitors to estab-
lish and maintain reasonable prices, and it will be enlightening to ob-
serve what stand the present Court takes with regard to these two pre-
cedents.
In the light of any new judicial expression and, more importantly,
in the light of the adequate statistical data and expert testimony which
should be presented to and considered by the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee, the place of the Robinson-Patman Act in the legal
chart which guides the national economy must be settled. Its relation-
ship to the tradition and present value of the Sherman Act must be de-
termined, for that was not done when it was passed. Perhaps price com-
-petition should be replaced by competition in Service and with a
Smile,"5 as, exaggeratedly, appears to be the trend of the Robinson-
Patman Act; but no such change was contemplated in its passage. The
which the defendants relied) than the Trenton Potteries case (upon which the gov-
ernment relied): "A study of the decisions of the Supreme Court convinces one that
the criterion employed in determining whether concerted action is such as to come
within the condemnation of the statute is the effect which the action has upon fair
competition. If concerted action destroys competition, it is immediately branded as
unlawful. In the Trenton Potteries case, as heretofore pointed out, competition was
destroyed under facts there existing by reason of the price fixing agreement. Con-
ceivably, however, a price fixing agreement is not unlawful under all circum-
stances . . ." See Jaffe and Tobriner, The Legality of Price-Fixing Agreements (1932),
45 Harv. L. Rev. 1164.
"Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933). Judge Chase cites
the Appalachian case for the following broad proposition: "And to determine
whether there is, or is threatened, an unreasonable restraint the particular conditions
of each case must be considered with care in the light of the circumstances shown and
effect be given to realities." Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co.,
1o3 F. (2d) 315, 321 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
"'United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927). With the attitude
of the Supreme Court in the Trenton Potteries'case should be compared the English
view in Northwestern Salt Co., Ltd., v. Electrolytic Alkali Co., Ltd., [1914] A. C.
461, 469: "Unquestionably the combination in question was one the purpose of which
was to regulate supply and keep up prices. But an ill-regulated supply and unre-
munerative prices may, in point of fact, be disadvantageous to the public."
1Chairman Freer of the Federal Trade Commission addressing the National Pe-
troleum Association, April 13, 1939: "In those industries which for one reason or an-
other are characterized by this so-called 'imperfect competition,' differences in price
and quality often become so minimized as factors in selling, that advertising ability
and sales personality are practically the only factors which remain to influence a
customer in placing his orders." See also "Preservation of Competition" Through
Federal Antitrust Laws (1938), 51 Harv. L. Rev. 694.
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pros and cons of price competition as affected by the Robinson-Patman
Act should now be considered with the broad outlook, unprejudiced
viewpoint and informed judgment not previously accorded. Govern-
ment regulation of business, whether by the prohibitions of the Sher-
man Act or the permissions of the NRA, has been at best vague-but it
should not also be aimless.
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Respondent
i. Kraft-Phenix Cheese
2. Shefford Cheese Co.
. Bird & Son, Inc.











i i. Charles of the Ritz
12. Hollywood Hat Co.
13. A. & P.
14. Biddle




2935 Quantity discounts; price discrim- Comp. dis.
ination. 7-17-37
2936 Quantity discounts; price discrim- Case Closed
ination. 10-30-37
2937 Discount discrimination. Comp. dis.
7-17-37
2951 Discount discrimination; function-
al classification.
2972 Discounts; bonuses; advertising al- Test. reop.
lowances; discrimination in pay- 9-12-39
ing demonstrators.
2973 Discounts; bonuses; advertising al- Test. reop.
lowances; demonstrators discrimi- 9-5-39
nation; demonstrators hidden.
2974 Demonstrators-hidden; demonstra- Test. reop.
tors-discrimination. 9-2-39
2975 Quantity discounts; demonstra- Test. reop.
tors discrimination; demonstrators 9-5-39
hidden.
2986 Quantity discounts. C&D6-i5-39
Reoponed
2987 Quantity discounts.
3017 Demonstrators-hidden; demonstra- Test. reop.
tors-discrimination; quantity dis- 9-2-39
counts; bonuses; advertising al-
lowances. "
3020 Price discrimination; misrepresen- C & D Order
tation of quality; spurious sam- 7-17-37
ples.
3o31 Discounts discrimination;fictitious C&D 1-25-38
brokerage. Appeal
3032 Discounts discrimination; fictitious C & D Order
brokerage. 7-17-37






15. Primrose House, Inc. 3o39












False claims as to trade marks,
registration, and manufacturer;
misrepresentation; advertising ser-
vice discrimination; exclusive deal-
ing contracts; price discrimination.
Discounts discrimination; fictitious
brokerage.
18. Oliver Bros., Inc. _3o88
19. Cast Iron Soil Pipe 3091
2o. Reeves, Parvin & Co. 3129
21. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. 3133
22. Pittsburgh Plate Glass 3154
23. Golf Ball Mfgrs. 3161
24. Cement Institute 3167
Discounts discrimination; fictitious C&D 12-31-37
brokerage. Appeal
Combination in restraint of trade;
price discrimination; basing point;







strators hidden; transportation al-
lowance discrimination.
Combination in restraint of trade;
combination to effect monopoly;
price fixing; price discrimination;
resale price maintenance; "white
list"; uniform discounts; uniform
terms of sale; refusal to sell; co-
ercion; arbitrary buyers classifica-
tion.
Price discrimination; royalties dis-
crimination; price fixing; combi-
nation in restraint of trade; coer-
cion; resale price maintenance.
Combination in restraint of trade;
price discrimination; basing point;
price fixing; collusive bids; uni-
form discounts; uniform terms of
sale; arbitrary classification of buy-




C & D Order
10-30-37






C & D Order
9-30-37
Case cld.
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Respondent D
25. Webb Crawford Co.
26. Quality Bakers of Am.
27. United Buyers Corp.
28. E. B. Muller & Co.
29. American Optical Co.




32. Hansen Inoculator Co.
3. Albert L. Whiting
34. Nitragin Company
.35 H. G. Brill Co.
S6. United Fence Mfg.
Association






ers; espionage; refusal to permit
diversion of shipments; boycott;
intimidation by threats of boy-




3218 Discounts discrimination; fictitious
brokerage.
3221 Discounts discrimination; fictitious
brokerage.
3224 Sales below cost; price discrimina-
tion; rebates discrimination; dis-
paragement; misrepresentation as
to quality and contents of freight
shipments.
3232 Price discrimination; rebates dis-
crimination; discounts discrimina-
tion.
3233 Price discrimination; rebates dis-
crimination; discounts discrimina-
tion.
3263 Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
3264 Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
3265 Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
3266 Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
3299 Price discrimination; rebates dis-
crimination; discounts discrimina-
tion.
3305 Restraint of trade; price discrimi-
nation; delivered price system;
uniform discounts; uniform terms
of sale; resale price maintenance;
coercion; refusal to sell; secret ap-
portionment of orders.
3330 Price discrimination.







C & D Order
1-21-39
C & D Order
1-21-39
C & D Order
1-12-38
C & D Order
1-12-38
C & D Order
1-12-38
C & D Order
1-12-38








.39 Merck and Company 3373
40. Miami Wholesale Drug 3377
Corporation
41. Curtice Bros. Co. 8381
42. Master Lock Co. 3386
43. American Flange and 3391
Mfg. Co.
44. Mississippi Sales Co. 3511
45. Superior Ceramic Corp. 3546
46. Trent Tile Co. 3547
47- Mosaic Tile Co. 3548
48. Pardee Matawan Tile 5549
Co.
49. Wenezel Tile Co. 3550
5o. Wheeling Tile Co. 3551
51. Architectural Tiling CO. 3552
52. National Tile Co. 5553
53- Corn Products Refining 3633
Co.






Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination; freight allowance dis-
crimination.
Exclusive dealing contracts; false
claims of patents and exclusive
rights; price discrimination; dis-
counts discrimination; quantity




Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
Price discrimination; discount dis-
crimination.
Delivered Price System; price dis-
crimination; advertising allowance
discrimination; services discrimi-







C & D Order
2-9-39
C & D Order
9-14-38
C 9- D Order
12-12-38
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55. General Baking Co. 3669
56. United States Rubber 3685
Co.
57. Luxor, Ltd.
58. San Pedro Fish Exch. 3739
et al.
59. Metz Bros. Baking Co. 374 o
6o. Lambert Pharmacal Co. 3749
61. Nutrine Candy Co. 3756
62. Chilean Nitrate Sales 3764
Corp.
63. Fruit &c Produce 3765
Exchange
64. Modern Marketing Ser- 3783
vice, Inc., et aLt.
65. Anheuser-Busch Inc. ' 3798
66. Pfel Bros. Starch Co.. 3799
67. Clinton Co. 3800
Charges
Price discrimination.




Combination in restraint of trade;
price fixing; cutting off of compet-
itors' supply; combination to effect







Price discrimination; rebate dis-
crimination; combination in re-
straint of trade; combination to
effect monopoly; price fixing; re-
sale price maintenance; basing
point; uniform rebates; uniform
freight charges; apportionment of
territory; coercion; intimidation
and threats; inducing uniform
hauling charges; distributors'
profits fixing; combination for se-









C 8or Price discrimination.
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Disposition
C 9- D Order
4-25-39




69. Penick & Ford Ltd., 3802
Inc.
70. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. 3803
71. Union Starch Co. 3804
72. American Maize 3805
Products Co.
73. A. S. Aloe Co. 3820
74. C. R. Anthony et al. 3834
75- Simmons Co. 3840
76. American Oil Co. 3843
77. Williams & Wilkins Co. 3841
78. General Motors 3886
79. National Numbering 3889
Machine Co.
8o. National Grain Yeast 393o
Corp.
81. P. Lorillard Co. 3912
82. Brown & Williamson 3913
Corp.
















Exclusive dealing contracts; price
discrimination; discounts discrimi-
nation; price fixing; resale price





Price discrimination; free goods
discrimination; discounts discrimi-
nation; bribery of employees and
customers.
Price discrimination; free goods
discrimination; discounts discrimi-
nation; bribery of employees and
customers.
Price discrimination, free goods
discrimination; discounts discrimi-
nation; bribery of employees and
customers.
Price discrimination; free goods
discrimination; discounts discrimi-





C & D Order
. 8-25-59
C & D Order
8-23-39
1939]




84. Larus & Bro. Inc. 3915
85. Charles V. Herron 3916
86. Phillip Morris & Co. 3919
Ltd., Inc.
87. Liggett & Myers 3921
Tobacco Co., Inc.
88. Stephano Bros. 3922
89. Federal Yeast Corp. 3926
go. American Tobacco Co. 3927
Charges
Price discrimination; free goods
discrimination; advertising allow-














discrimination; free goods discrim-
ination.
Price discrimination; free goods
discrimination; advertising allow-
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The Editors wish to express their appreciation to the following
members of the Class of 1939 whose work qualified them for member-
ship on the REVIEW and whose endeavors contributed to its establish-
ment: J. D. Head, E. T. Cannon, P. M. Grabill, R. F. Hutcheson, Jr.,
W. W. Perkins, W. F. Woodward.
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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
THE LAW REVIEW
With this number the WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW makes its
appearance and takes its place, though a modest one, with the honor-
able company of law school publications. We express our thanks and
appreciation to all of those whose cooperation has made its publication
possible. It represents a great deal. of hard work on the part of the stu-
dents and faculty advisers. All those so participating feel that they are
richly repaid for their work not only in the experience gained from the
investigations made but in having this publication of their law school
take its place before the public.
We are also grateful to our friends who contributed the leading ar-
ticles in this number. It is our hope and our promise that each number
of this review will represent the same sincere effort which made this
publication possible. W. H. MORELAND, Dean
THE LAW SCHOOL
The law school enrollment for 1939-194o numbers 105 men. The
past several years have witnessed little change in the size of the student
body. To the teaching staff has been added Mr. T. A. Smedley, a grad-
uate of the Northwestern University Law School, who serves as librarian
and assistant professor of law.'Mr. R. H. Gray of the Faculty of the
School of Commerce and Administration continues to devote part of
his time to teaching in the law school. This additional help, coupled
with some rearrangement of courses, has made it possible to strengthen
the work of the school to a very appreciable degree. The curriculum has
been enlarged to include the following new courses: Security I, Debtors'
Estates, Insurance, Security II, Administrative Law, Federal Procedure,
Business Associations II, Taxation.
Work in the library has been greatly facilitated by the assistance
rendered by the librarian. The most ressing need of the library at this
time is additional codes. The cost of many of these is beyond the pres-
ent budget. The appearance of the library has been much improved by
the hanging of the portraits of John White Brockenbrough, John Ran-
dolph Tucker, Charles A. Graves, Henry St. George Tucker, and Mar-
tin P. Burks. These portraits were presented by friends of the law school
and were received with appropriate ceremonies. It is hoped that the
portraits of William Reynolds Vance and Joseph Ragland Long, former
deans of the school, will be made available in the near future.
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